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The evolving role of public research institutes in the world in the recent decades has placed significant challenges for them. 
Governments and stakeholders continue to question their relevance and their ability to adapt to the changing circumstances 
and demands from society. Attempts to develop new organizational models and management strategies are common in both 
developed and emerging economies. Public R&D laboratories are thus faced with the need to undertake rapid organizational 
learning processes in order to adapt and to maintain legitimacy. However, these learning processes may be more complex 
and difficult when the institutional arrangements in which these organizations are nested are themselves immature. We 
present an analysis of those learning processes on the basis organizational case studies in Mexico and abroad. Theoretical 
and policy issues are discussed. 
 






Public research has long been an important 
instrument for governments, as they attempt to address 
market failures and inadequacies in the production of 
knowledge. Public research institutions enable the 
generation of pre competitive technological knowledge as 
well as the generation of science-based solutions to social, 
health and energy issues, for example. 
For industrial economies, the development path for 
public research organizations has been a long one (Layton 
1977, Edgerton and Horrocks 1994, Libik 1969). They have 
widely diversified organizational forms and niches (Crow 
and Bozeman 1987, 1998, Doern and Kinder 2002) and 
many institutional arrangements for their support have been 
tried, evaluated and changed. 
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://www.jotmi.org) 
JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT & INNOVATION © JOTMI Research Group 
98
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2007, Volume 2, Issue 4 
 
Even so, in the recent decade their role has been 
increasingly called into question (Lawton-Smith 1997, 
Doern and Kinder 2002, Smith 1997, Dickson 1994, Crow 
and Bozeman 1998) and continues to evolve as patterns in 
the social production of knowledge also continue to change 
(Larédo and Mustar 2004, Cesaroni et al. 2004, Erlich and 
Gutterman 2003, Gonard 1999, Westwick 2007, Arnold et 
al. 1998, Simpson 2004). 
Even though their trajectory is significantly 
shorter, public R&D laboratories in emerging economies 
face important pressures for change as well. They try to 
respond to these environmental pressures by developing 
new strategies and management practices (Maculan and 
Moraes-Zouain 1999, Roy and Mohapatra 2002, 
Arechavala and Díaz 2004, Gupta et al. 2000, Katrak 1998, 
Rama Mohan and Ramakrishna Rao 2005). In many ways, 
external demands placed on them resemble those that 
laboratories in industrialized economies do, although within 
very different and usually inadequate institutional contexts 
(Sutz 2000, Peritore and Glave-Peritore 1995, Arocena and 
Sutz 2000, Marques and Gonçalves 2007, Cassiolato and 
Martins 2000, Scheel 2002, Koschatzky 2002) that 
represent important challenges for their development. 
Change is thus a perennial condition for public 
R&D laboratories while, at the same time, their role and 
mission calls for stability and long-range capability 
development. For public R&D institutes in emerging and 
developed economies, then, it is important to strive 
continually to change and to adapt. But do differences in 
their institutional contexts differentially affect their ability 
to learn? 
In order to address this issue, it is important to 
understand that they respond to pressures inherent to their 
role. Some theoretical approaches are relevant to 
understand the causes for these pressures. Being public 
organizations, resources that they need depend on decisions 
from people (government agencies) that must trust their 
ability and commitment to provide the social benefits. Since 
R&D is also an inherently uncertain activity, no guarantee 
can be produced beforehand about the solutions for 
technical problems being readily available, or with respect 
to the time the labs will take in producing knowledge, of 
significant economic and social value. 
Thus, public research institutes face agency 
problems that reflect in performance evaluation criteria 
(Lyall et al. 2004, Coccia 2001, 2004), asymmetry of 
information and autonomy issues (Fernández 2007). Also, 
public R&D institutes necessarily have to cope with 
governance problems that arise from the national science 
and technology system they are part of (OECD 2003, Doern 
and Kinder 2002). 
Environmental pressures exerted upon public R&D 
laboratories are expressed through those organizations with 
which they interact in order to obtain resources and 
legitimacy for their operation. We would thus expect that, 
to the extent that mutual expectations shift, or that there is 
discrepancy or ambiguity in those expectations, would 
those environmental pressures will tend to manifest 
themselves as inter organizational conflict and negotiation 
around performance evaluation, accountability, autonomy, 
and resource allocation decisions, for example. 
In what follows we present results from an 
ongoing research program that addresses these concerns, 
and explores the ways in which differences in institutional 
contexts affect the ways in which laboratories learn the 
appropriate ways to develop and adapt the strategies with 
which they respond to the issues that have been discussed. 
Results are derived from organizational case studies and 
interviews conducted in several countries, highlighting 
similarities and differences in environmental pressures that 
public research institutes face, and in the strategies that they 
develop in response. 
This article presents primarily a comparison 
between Canadian and Mexican public R&D institutes. 
This comparison is relevant in light of interesting 
similarities and differences in the two countries and in the 





Results presented here are based on five in-depth 
organizational case studies that we have conducted so far in 
Mexico and Canada, and on more than 50 interviews 
conducted with research and management personnel from 
other R&D organizations in Brazil, Korea and the United 
States.  
Organizational case studies were conducted in site 
visits between 2002 and 2006. For each one of them several 
methods for data collection were used: 
1. Gathering and analysis of internal working and 
planning documents in each case (strategic plans, 
performance and evaluation documents, legal documents, 
governing board meeting minutes, and so on); 
2. Site visits and systematic observation of the 
centers’ working areas. When possible our research group 
participated in some relevant events in each center 
(evaluation of planning meetings, for example). 
3. Interviews with managers, research and 
engineering personnel, technicians and administrative 
personnel, as well as with center’s client firms (from small 
to medium and big enterprises). 
The study also includes interviews with 
government officers and science and technology systems’ 
managers involved in the design and operation of S&T 
policies that affect the centers’ operation and development. 
 Analyses of national S&T policies and of the 
general performance indicators for the S&T system in the 
different countries provided important information used to 
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differentiate the level of rational policy planning from 
operative regulations implemented by subordinate federal 
or state government officers. All of the interviews used 
dealt with R&D centers’ personnel perceptions of 
environmental demands.  
Qualitative (content) analysis of interview 
transcripts was used to identify opinions and perceptions 
that are used to understand the strategy building processes 
in the centers. 
 
Data Collection: Interviews in each case study 
were semi structured. A case study protocol (Yin 1984) 
helped ensure reliability. Interview guides ensured that data 
collection focused always on interviewees’ perceptions of 
environmental demands placed on the organization and on 
the strategies that it generates at the organizational, group 
and individual level in order to respond to them. Construct 
validity is established by using multiple sources of 
evidence, and by triangulation of key references through 
other interviews and documents, as well as on-site direct 
observation (Yin 1984, Eisenhardt 1989, 1991). 
Each interview was done by two persons, one who 
conducted the interview, and one who observed and took 
notes about the context, the attitude of the person 
interviewed, the interview guide and other secondary 
details. Interviews were recorded in electronic equipment 
and lasted for about 1.5 hours, on average. Depending on 
the center’s profile and on availability of interviewees, a 
sample of the personnel population was selected, using the 
following criteria: 1. People who have worked at the center 
since its creation. 2. People from each part of the 
organizational structure (departments, divisions, groups, 
projects, functions, etc.). 3. People that represent each kind 
of role required in the organization (manager, researcher, 
technician, administrative personnel). 4. People that had 
recently entered the organization. 5. People identified as 
key informants because of their privileged vantage points in 
the organization and because of their ability to observe its 
history. In the Mexican case, some interviews were held 
with the national R&D system managers. Whenever 
possible, interviews were conducted with representatives of 
the centers’ client firms (companies, trade associations, 
other laboratories, etc.). 
Altogether, 204 interviews were made. 22.5% of 
them were conducted with members of higher and middle 
management, 61.8% with engineering and research 
personnel, and 14.7% with representatives of firms that the 
labs interact with, although percentages are not the same for 
each center studied. 
 
Data Analysis: Transcripts of the interviews were 
analyzed using QSR NUD*IST (NVivo), a content analysis 
software. Content analysis was done through the following 
procedures: 
1. An inductive codification process permitted the 
identification of categories not used in the interview plans, 
but that revealed specific organizational culture and 
language with respect to the processes of interest; 
2. Theoretically derived systematic searches, as 
defined in case study guidelines; 
3. Once coding categories were standardized, 
patterns of association among them were identified. From 
theoretically derived concepts of strategy and 
organizational learning, for example, equivalent references 
were identified in each center’s particular language and 
patterns of discourse, and searches as well as coding runs 
were then repeated for all of the interviews, in order to find 
patterns of association among them. 
In this fashion, for example, concepts like 
“partnering with industry” were found to be used as 
organizational mechanisms and strategies for responding to 
external demands and for improving a center’s 
performance. Thereafter, equivalent phrases were used to 
identify occurrences of the concept, such as “joint 
ventures”, “industry funds”, and the like, as long as they 
were used contextually for the same purpose. Coded 
paragraphs were then kept for pattern analysis. 
This process was repeated for each center, and 
then comparisons were made among them. This comparison 
permitted the identification and classification of strategies, 
and of their association with perceived environmental 
demands, or with specific organizational learning 




The function of strategies examined in those 
centers we have studied bears a strong relationship with two 
factors: environmental demands and internal organizational 
requirements. Although there are some differences, the 
study identifies in the different cases common processes 
and problems in strategy building. Also, we are concerned 
with strategies that operate at a working level, and not 
necessarily at an explicit and rational planning level. 
Even though both in Canada and Mexico very few 
interviewees could recall specific formal policy directives, 
a de facto pressure for transferring R&D costs to industry is 
consistently identified by interviewees in different levels in 
laboratories from both countries. In Canadian laboratories, 
this demand is perceived as strongly related to social and 
political evaluation of the centers’ performance: 
“Even politicians now talk about 
‘return on investment’ (...) they like to 
see activities that lead to new jobs, to 
job creation, because for government 
people the creation of jobs is a very 
good benchmark for success, for a 
strong economy (...) good fundamental 
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science is important, but we know 
they are looking for more than that”. 
 
Canada has a longer tradition in the development 
of science and technology organizations, and social 
expectations in the development of wealth and social 
benefits are more strongly rooted in its culture. This is 
explicitly stated by interviewees: 
 
“To a large extent, the development of 
a culture of consistent support for 
science has to do with the role that it 
played during the war. In this, Canada 
is close to the US and Europe. They 
all saw how scientists played a large 
role in winning the war, mainly 
through the atomic bomb and the 
development of radar, for example. 
This support has followed the spirit of 
the (Vannevar Bush’s) ‘Endless 
Frontier’. 
“This (history) also explains in part 
the mission-oriented view of science 
we hold. Its role in (…) developing 
wealth for the nation is clear: it can be 
clearly seen in its applications in 
agriculture, forestry, fishery, 
biotechnology, for example (...) (the 
Canadian government) has invested 
consistently in research for many 
years…” 
 
Many R&D organizations and programs are 
created with explicit mandates as to the economic benefits 
that are sought through them: 
“But (…) was established really 
because of the requirement of the 
government of Canada to look at 
economic development within the area 
of life science (...) its basic objective 
is therefore to act as a catalyst, to pull 
together this life science cluster in the 
province. That’s our general mission 
(…) because in (the province) a lot of 
the existing industry is life science, 
forestry, fishing, environment (…) so 
with that I mean we have a lot of 
interest in life science.” 
 
Clear common values and government policies 
provide a sound and coherent framework in which strategic 
decisions can be made by higher management in Canadian 
laboratories, even though a still wide margin remains for 
choosing specific development strategies: 
“If you speak to people here about 
what our mandate is, you will 
generally get a similar answer (…) 
that our mandate, as part of the 
National Research Council is to 
conduct research in science and 
technology which will be of benefit to 
Canada. I think we all agree on those 
words. How you interpret that, and 
how you then establish a research 
program to deliver on that mandate is 
open to a lot of personal 
interpretation”. 
 
In almost every Canadian laboratory where 
interviews were conducted, differences in outlooks and 
interpretations need a deliberate effort to integrate them: 
(How do you integrate all of those 
visions from the organization into one 
coherent set of research programs?): 
“Not easily”. 
 
Different research units within a given laboratory 
would spell their interpretation of the organization’s 
mandate in different ways, but mostly in terms of a 
continuum: 
“I think that if you speak to different 
people around here, in this building, I 
think you would find very different 
views of really what constitutes 
research that is focused in creating 
knowledge that is valuable for firms 
(…) some people have a very long 
term view, and will say that 
fundamental research in genomics, 
very early technology development in 
gene discovery, while it may be very 
far away from commercial 
applications, is still research that is 
fundamentally important for the 
country and yeah, that’s true. In the 
other extreme, people will talk about 
research that will lead to new 
developments that will help existing 
companies to grow, that will attract 
external companies to come, or will 
perhaps even lead to the creation of 
new companies”. 
 
Higher management and research units constantly 
have to make decisions with long term implications, which 
commit them along different development trajectories: 
“We cannot do all things equally well. 
Traditionally, because of the nature of 
our organization, we are first and 
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foremost a research organization (…) 
also we have certain advantages 
because of the history of our 
organization, and because the kind of 
budgets we have had in the past, we 
have been one of the few 
organizations in Canada that has been 
able to establish a (specialized 
technology) facility (…) we have the 
ability to engage in large, fundamental 
projects, that would be very difficult 
for others…” 
 
Even though no formal policy measures are cited, 
a push towards more relevance for public research institutes 
is a clear and distinct message perceived by most 
interviewees: 
“I own feeling is that we are probably 
at a turning point, where NRC will 
migrate, over the next few years, and 
be more focused on the downstream 
applications of turning research into 
economic activity. This is only my 
opinion, there is discussion about this 
just now but, if I listen to some of the 
things that our senior people say, and 
listen to politicians talking (…) even 
politicians now talk about return on 
investment.” 
 
In order to chart their course and to adapt to these 
external demands, Canadian laboratories carefully and 
explicitly select their strategies: 
“One way we do (adapt to external 
demands) is by the people that we 
hire. There are some areas we work in, 
and some areas that we will not work 
in (…) rather than spread out our 
activities a bit in many different 
(fields) we strategically decided to 
restrict our focus, in order to have a 
critical mass (…) we do make those 
strategic decisions on an ongoing 
basis.” 
 
Each organization selects its own position in the 
basic – applied research – innovation continuum: 
“We want to concentrate in fields 
where we have the opportunities to 
create some new discoveries that will 
be useful (…) possibly to create some 
intellectual property which we could 
provide to companies to help them, to 
give companies a strategic advantage 
(…) if we can’t identify potential 
applications, and even some potential 
partners, companies that might be 
willing to adopt the discoveries that 
we make, then it’s probably not an 
area we would engage in.” 
 
One of the most visible demands placed on public 
R&D organizations in many countries is to increase the 
relevance of their work to industry. In Mexico however, the 
application of science and technology to innovation has a 
much less developed tradition. The country has not 
participated in any major war in the last century, and its 
industrialization process started only in the second half of 
the century. Under import substitution policies, the role that 
science and technology can play in industry is still not a 
part of the average business manager’s culture. The types of 
solutions that can be expected from them are not part of his 
working horizon. As in other Latin American countries, like 
Brazil, the process of creation of R&D centers occurs 
belatedly, and in a context where there is little demand for 
their services (OECD 2001). 
Specific ambiguities exist in the institutional 
environment of the Mexican centers, as perceived by both 
managers and research personnel in the centers, that thwart 
their attempts to deploy successful development strategies. 
When questioned about it, interviewees perceive no evident 
or formal policies that are consistently applied. Rather, they 
perceive inconsistent or opposing demands from those 
organizations with which they must routinely interact. 
Opposing signals are not deliberate. In the view of 
a former high-level official of one of the organizations that 
oversee the centers’ operation, they work rather within an 
institutional gap: while their budget is allocated by the 
Education Ministry (SEP), they are expected to follow 
directives from the National Council for Science and 
Technology (CONACYT). For both institutions public 
R&D centers represent a negligible fraction of their budget, 
and to both of them they also represent little performance 
visibility: 
“(…) as part of the scientific system 
public research institutes (PRI’s) mean 
little, and in the technology area very 
little was done … (between 1992 and 
2000) CONACYT did not fund them, 
it was the SEP where they got their 
budget from, and they were 
accountable for very little. (PRIs) 
were funded federally, and they were 
not accountable to (CONACYT’s) 
director for its use. The head of the 
Education Ministry named the PRIs’ 
CEO’s and only eventually asked 
CONACYT’s officials for an opinion. 
(PRI’s are of little interest for SEP, it 
would just bundle them under one 
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://www.jotmi.org) 
JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT & INNOVATION © JOTMI Research Group 
102
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2007, Volume 2, Issue 4 
 
heading. The essence of its policy was 
to give them money and do nothing. 
There’s nobody to control them, 
which is the important point. The 
SEP-CONACYT joint directorship did 
not control them. They would meet 
with [the labs’ CEO’s] only twice in 
the administration’s six year term. The 
under secretary for planning would 
decide about budget increments for 
them. Zero importance within the 
federal system. They operate in a kind 
of vacuum. At that time they fell into 
an institutional vacuum. To fire or not 
to fire a PRI’s CEO was not a relevant 
decision for CONACYT’s Director 
General, and the under secretary did 
not want any problems with them.” 
 
In the Mexican cases, this directive is not part of a 
formal policy measure, either. It is rather applied through 
different informal mechanisms, such as profitability studies 
conducted by World Bank personnel, or mentioned in 
governing boards’ meetings: 
“During X’s tenure (as Director 
General of CONACYT) we were held 
accountable for budgetary self-
sufficiency and, as far as I understand, 
that was a directive that came from the 
World Bank, following models that 
were established in other countries. 
(…) At the General Directorship level 
in CONACYT there was talk that if 
public R&D labs did not achieve 
budgetary self-sufficiency, they would 
be privatized.” 
 
Higher CONACYT officials have pushed in the 
last decade for increased profitability and for privatization 
of the laboratories. Some of them have adapted their 
strategies, their internal workflows, their formal and 
informal structures, and even their culture to this aim. 
However, these efforts are severely hindered by restrictions 
imposed by other government agencies. Procedural norms 
imposed by institutions in charge of overseeing 
administrative processes require lengthy and elaborate 
processes to ensure the correct management of public 
funds. While the National S&T Program has set ambitious 
growth goals in this area, the Federal Treasury imposes 
severe restrictions in hiring of new personnel and 
systematically turns down applications. 
Organizations that routinely interact with the 
centers do not yet offer a fertile ground for the dissipation 
of these ambiguities. The labs’ governing boards, for 
example, typically include members of federal and local 
governments, industry associations, overseeing 
organizations, CONACYT, firms’ CEOs, and federal 
support organizations. Content analysis of these governing 
bodies’ meeting registries reveals that, lacking knowledge 
of the inherent requirements of the centers’ activities and 
mission, participants tend to fall back on procedural 
(normative) issues and bureaucratic rituals. Only 
exceptionally are the centers’ strategic objectives discussed. 
Industry issues and needs are not. Decisions regarding the 
center’s development path or technological competencies 
are discussed less than normative and bureaucratic 
requirements, the projects’ costs and the income generated. 
“(…) the Board of Directors had 
become involved more as protocol 
than in an effective manner. For some, 
being a member of the Board was not 
a task that deserved investing time or 
dedication, and so they would send a 
representative and, as I have said, it 
wasn’t even always the same person. 
This practice meant a high turnover 
among those who attended the 
meetings of the Board of Directors. 
Sometimes even the “representative of 
the representative” would be the one 
to attend, but the worst was when 
somebody, without having attended 
any previous meeting, or knowing 
anything about the R&D center, would 
make statements and pass judgment on 
important issues, that would even 
become part of the board’s decisions 
and recommendations… and nobody 
would hear from him again. Thus, 
knowledge about the organization, 
about its plans and its 
accomplishments, was very poor, and 
contributions to the center’s direction 
were therefore also very poor. Instead 
of facilitating the CEO’s role, all of 
this would severely restrict the ability 
to chart long-range plans for the 
organization.” 
 
Another resulting ambiguity is in the choice of 
performance indicators: the centers can be periodically 
evaluated with sets of indicators that are inconsistent. A 
center may be evaluated in the same period with criteria 
that favor basic science and international publications, 
while being required also to deliver radically different 
results, such as the income generated from services to 
industry. 
“Look, the idea of conducting 
research, as far as I can recall, was 
that CONACYT would send us money 
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(…) it would send us money and then, 
while everybody is out trying to sell 
(services to industry), … when all 
resources are dedicated to selling 
services to industry (…) CONACYT 
keeps funding us. There are no 
research results. This caused a 
problem between the CEO and the 
Board of Directors. ¿Where are the 
research results? So then his strategy 
was to tell everybody to forget about 
research, and that those within 
‘productive’ areas were not expected 
to do any research at all”. 
 
Thus, what interviewees perceive as operational 
directives are opposed and inconsistent signals that they 
receive from different sources. For example, the National 
Research System (SNI, for its acronym in Spanish) rewards 
individual productivity, as reflected in international 
publications, while work units and the centers themselves 
are expected to increase the income derived from services 
to industry every year. This absence of coordination gives 
the centers the opportunity to select and bargain for 
performance criteria suitable to their own profile and 
interests, in order to obtain and justify necessary resources. 
While this would seem to be a favorable context in 
which to operate, it increases the inconsistency in their 
development paths. It also requires shifts in goals and 
objectives that prove costly in the short run, in the long run, 
or both. Resources have to be allocated to non 
complementary tasks (research vs. routine services, for 
example), or diverted from previous objectives into new 
ones as priorities change, or as incentive systems change 
the payoff assigned to different tasks. These strategies are 
not always consistent among themselves.  
 
Table 1: Policies, requirements and strategies in Mexican R&D Labs.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ORGANIZATIONAL REQUIREMENTS STRATEGIES 
• Limited funds for research 
personnel’s positions and salaries. 
• Shortage of personnel needed to carry 
out a growing number of projects 
funded by industry. 
• Outsourcing projects in order to face 
demand. 
• Reductions in funding. 
• Pressure towards labs’ financial self-
sufficiency. 
• Erratic budgetary allocations from 
funding agencies. 
• Increase income from services to 
industry. 
• Develop income-related 
performance indicators at 
individual, group and organization 
levels. 
• Increase sales of low value-added 
services. 
• Pressures towards R&D centers’ 
financial self-sufficiency. 
• Reductions in federal funding. 
• A mandate to attend to the needs of 
Mexican industry, particularly 
SME’s. 
• To foster business demand for locally 
developed technology. 
• Need to increase income drives 
them to give priority to demands 
from multi-national corporations. 
 
• Slow administrative formal and 
bureaucratic procedures imposed by 
normative requirements. 
• Subordinate technical workflow to 
client time demands and problems. 
• Priority of a timely response to 
firms’ needs faces problems with 
overseeing government agencies. 
 
 
Inconsistencies in priorities and strategies give rise 
to internal divisions among work units, since their different 
profiles and composition lead them to select and push for 
the use of different performance criteria for them. Units that 
have much contact with clients push for one set of 
performance criteria, while units in charge of developing 
long-range technological competencies will advocate a 
different one. The ensuing tensions are costly for the 
organization, since at some point these tensions will feed 
back on themselves, and severely hinder the organization’s 
ability to fulfill its mission. 
The centers attempt, for example, to increase the 
income derived from services to industry, while at the same 
time they try to build a far-sighted technological knowledge 
base. Thus, research personnel and work units are always 
under a tension to achieve results under inconsistent 
performance criteria. As this tension builds, a gap between 
engineering or technical service personnel and researchers 
creates a sharp division within the organization. 
Within these constraints, the centers are trying to 
open and develop industrial technology markets. In order to 
do so, they need to provide low-level services, in order to 
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gain a foothold in industry. However, this seems to be a 
dead end path, since in this venue firms usually hire the 
center’s services for non essential processes, because higher 
level technology development is usually performed at the 
transnational corporations’ headquarters. 
Despite these hindrances, some cases arise in 
which the structure and logic of private enterprises’ 
technological needs promote the development of joint 
learning processes between the firms’ and the centers’ 
personnel. Some of the cases of these processes found in 
our fieldwork, however, have difficulty in achieving the 
necessary continuity for the development of long term 
technological competencies. In the view of some of the 
entrepreneurs interviewed, for example, as the center’s 
personnel are reallocated to different workgroups, in order 
to pursue higher income projects, the learning process, and 
the building of confidence and trust that go with it, needs to 
be restarted.  
In this context, the centers themselves, their work 
units, and individuals in them, cope by attempting to fulfill 
their mission by learning on several fronts. While in some 
cases this learning is quite active, deliberate and dynamic, it 
is not always so. Sometimes the organization will linger 
with a workflow or formal structure that is not functional.  
Content analysis of interviews reveals that learning 
takes place at different levels in the organization. 
Individuals adapt to perceived priorities, as reflected mostly 
by incentive systems. Groups shift their efforts in 
developing technological competencies accordingly. Higher 
managers direct the work units’ efforts toward different 
industrial market and commercializing strategies, as they 
perceive opportunities and restrictions in the environment. 
The learning process is mostly associated with: 
1. An attempt to deal with restrictions imposed by 
organizations that the centers depend on, the 
purpose of developing technological competencies 
that have market potential, while at the same time 
having long range possibilities,  
2. The identification and selection of industrial 
markets, their technological needs, and the ways in 
which to respond to them, 
the ways in which to interact with client firms, 
3. The operationalization of these strategies into 
performance targets for individuals and work units, 
and to deal with the tensions that they create, 
4. The design of an adequate formal structure, of an 
appropriate division of labor and integration 
mechanisms, the adjustment of work unit 
composition, workflows, etc., in order to achieve 
performance targets, 
5. Cultural values and work patterns that are more 
conducive to achieving the desired results. 
It is noticeable that, in some instances, this 
learning process is referred to as happening in contact with 
institutions that perform equivalent roles in foreign 
countries, rather than from contact with other national 
laboratories or with local firms or government 
organizations. Contact with foreign laboratories occurs 
either when those institutions concurrently serve clients in 
Mexico, or when the center approaches them explicitly for 
advice. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
Even though not completely similar, many of the 
strongest environmental demands that public R&D labs 
face are similar in the different contexts. However, in 
emerging economies the process through which these 
organizations learn the right strategies for responding to 
them is made more difficult by institutional ambiguities and 
by the lack of consistency in the interaction patterns that the 
lab must have with other organizations with which they 
must interact. 
The strategy followed in Mexico, as in many other 
developing economies, of attempting to pursue (either 
implicitly or explicitly) policies implemented elsewhere, is 
misleading for those organizations involved. As has been 
documented elsewere (Fontes and Coombs 1996, for 
example), this approach misleads policy makers and 
organizational leaders into trying to incompletely 
implement foreign models, where essential parts of the 
structures and processes are either absent of incompatible. 
Such a naïve imitation of foreign policies thwarts the 
organizations’ possibilities to learn effectively and succeed 
in fulfilling their missions. 
When the drive to increase relevance of public 
institutions to industry and social welfare is confused with 
lowering the cost of public research for governments, R&D 
labs are faced with mandates and directives that are not 
compatible with the institutional environment they are in. In 
developing economies, public support and funding for 
science and technology do not have the strength and 
tradition that they have in industrialized economies. R&D 
laboratories are thus forced to attempt the fulfillment of 
their mandates without the support of other organizations 
with which they interact, and without adequate resources. 
Public R&D centers reflect those constraints and 
opportunities that are present in the organizational networks 
they belong to. As other organizations exert demands and 
pressures over the labs, they attempt to adapt to those 
restrictions and opportunities through diverse strategies. 
However, these strategies do not necessarily enhance 
productivity either within the centers or in the networks that 
develop around them. Some strategies create visible costs 
and tensions within the centers and between them and the 
organizations they interact with. 
As compared to full-fledged innovation clusters, 
observed networks in our fieldwork seem to be in the 
process of developing the necessary interactions and 
processes. It is evident, however, that participating 
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organizations are still falling short of being able to interlock 
their activities in order to achieve common goals. This 
problem has both a formal and a cultural component. 
Formally, organizational mandates and directives in the 
networks may be either inconsistent or divergent. Roles 
performed by different organizations in the network may 
not be complementary. 
A common view of science and technological 
development as a source of regional competitiveness and 
social wealth seems to be essential for the system to 
function. A significant social capital must also be present, 
in the form of trust that enables joint learning, in order to 
allow for the proper kinds of inter organizational 
collaboration. 
Public R&D institutes cannot fulfill their mission 
on their own. If innovation networks are to appear in other 
than a random fashion, an explicit “institutional 
engineering” effort has to be undertaken. This effort must 
include the participation of many organizations, at the 
regional and the federal level. 
Institutional engineering needs to be done in the 
Mexican context, with the whole network in mind. A sense 
of common purpose and values needs to be built. A 
common vision must grow out of shared goals and values. 
This endeavour requires significant leadership in the 
networks. To a large extent, this leadership role is currently 
being undertaken by the centers themselves. However, trial 
and error learning is costly for the whole system, and the 
necessary continuity in the learning processes is still short 
of what is needed. Perhaps more important, a significant 
amount of social capital is lost whenever nascent networks 
fail. 
Regional governments can also take the leadership. 
Under the realization that economic changes deeply affect 
their regional economies, state governments in Mexico are 
beginning to outline regional economic initiatives. Some 
local governments are designing policy measures to 
promote a stronger integration of foreign investment to 
local capabilities and innovation. 
In order to be fruitful, investment in science and 
technology should be a priority in these strategies, both at 
the local and at the federal level. It is also important to 
realize that, left to themselves, these networks will seldom 
develop successfully, and even then, will not yield their 
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